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NOTES
BANK RECORDKEEPING AND THE CUSTOMER'S
EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
When a customer writes a check, applies for a loan, or transfers money
to an account, he communicates with his bank.' For most customers, doing
business with a bank is not an entirely volitional act; maintaining a bank
account is essential for anyone who wishes to transact business in contem-
porary society. But whenever a customer communicates with his bank,
he also inescapably reveals much data about himself-his whereabouts,
associations, needs, values, and tastes. His bank records have been said to
provide his "current biography."'2  At one time a customer could exercise
some control over who had access to his bank records, since many banks
did not photocopy or retain them over long periods or for purposes other
than internal bank use.8  In 1970, however, Congress passed the Bank
Secrecy Act, which required banks to record a customer's checks and identity,
and which provided for disclosure of the records to the Government when
needed in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. 4 Manda-
1. For purposes of this article, a "customer" will be defined as any individual who
patronizes and utilizes the services of a bank. The term "bank" refers to a commercial
bank, the deposits of which are insured under 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1970). "Bank
records" will refer to checking account records held by commercial banks.
2. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247-48, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974). See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S.
21, 78-79 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring), 85-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1974);
Hearings on Wiretapping, Electronic Eavesdropping, and Other Surveillance Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 26, pt. 1, at 189 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 House Surveillance Hearings]; Hearings on S. 3814 and S. 3828 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Senate
Hearings].
3. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1343 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-52
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Hearings].
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59, & 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83, 1101-05,
1121-22 (1970). Section 1829b(d) is the domestic recordkeeping provision most fre-
quently applicable to personal checking accounts at commercial banks. The record-
keeping regulations are set out at 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.31-.37 (1976). Checks for less
than $100 are exempt from the current regulations. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.34(b)(3), (4)
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tory recordkeeping under the Bank Secrecy Act made customer records more
accessible to the Government at a time of acute public concern over govern-
mental intrusion into individual privacy.
The customer's communications to his bank, like the client's communica-
tions to his attorney and the patient's communications to his physician, have
often been characterized as "confidential." They are not legally privileged
or immune from production upon showing of probable cause, but the cus-
tomer does expect his bank to honor in good faith the trust which their
relationship entails by not disclosing information in its possession concern-
ing his financial affairs. 5 The bank's duty toward its customers' records
has usually been expressed in terms of preserving "confidentiality," while the
customers' expectations have been described in terms of a right of "privacy,"
but the terms are not conceptually synonymous. In passing the Privacy Act
of 1974,6 Congress adopted the distinction in terminology between these two
words which appeared in a 1972 National Academy of Sciences project. 7
The term "privacy," according to this study, involves the social policy of
what information should be collected at all and how much should be retained
within a single system, whereas "confidentiality" concerns the maintenance of
controls to prevent the unauthorized release of information which has been
collected.8 Thus bank records would properly be described as "confidential"
instead of "private," since the customer is concerned not with the right of
(1976). However, the Secretary of the Treasury has broad authority under the Act to
alter the regulations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b) (1970); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.21, 103.31
(1976). Furthermore, the copying machines which many banks use cannot discriminate
as to the dollar amounts of checks which are copied-the result being that all checks
are photocopied, although the regulations do not require it.
5. See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 10
AM. JuR. 2d Banks § 332 (1963); 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKINc ch. 9 § 1 (1973).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (7th ed. 1972) states that a confidential relation "is
not confined to any specific association of parties. It appears when the circumstances
make it certain that the parties do not deal on equal terms, but on the one side there
is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifi-
ably reposed." Cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 528 (McNaughton rev. 1961):
"mhe mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or in the
implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege."
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1974). Both the American Civil Liberties Union and
a select committee appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare recom-
mended that the Act's code of fair information practice be extended to all automated
personal data systems, but because of time considerations and complex legislative draft-
ing problems, the Act as passed applied only to governmental information exchange.
S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1974). See also 1975 House Surveillance
Hearings, supra note 2, at 277-81.
7. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 393 (A. Westin
& M. Baker eds. 1972).
8. Id. See S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).
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the bank to collect the information necessary to process the items in his ac-
count, but with the release of information once collected.
Until recently, the few American courts which have dealt with the bank-
customer relationship have recognized both the bank's duty of confidentiality
and the customer's right of privacy," but neither has been codified.' 0 None-
theless, in recent cases in which courts have protected the customer's interest,
privacy rather than confidentiality has been the frame of reference. Bank
records have never been accorded explicit constitutional protection from un-
reasonable search and seizure, but it has long been recognized that the fourth
amendment protects personal papers and records as well as the individual
himself." After the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States that the
applicability of the fourth amendment should be governed by the individual's
expectation of privacy, 12 several courts reasoned that the customer's bank
records were entitled to fourth amendment protection and that his right to
receive notice of his bank's intention to release his records and his standing
to contest an order served on his bank were constitutionally protected under
the fourth amendment. 3
More often than not, however, courts have declined to protect bank records
from government access since the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Secrecy Act as applied to
the bank in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,14 and in United States
v. Miller'5 it held that the recordkeeping requirements of the Act violated no
fourth amendment rights of the customer. 16 Although the records in Miller
were obtained from two banks through, the issuance of allegedly defective
subpoenas duces tecum and without notice to the customer, the Court upheld
9. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166 (1974); cases cited in note 24 infra. See generally 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 482 (1970).
10. Proposed legislation in at least two states would codify the relationship in a
manner similar to proposed federal legislation. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§ 224-27
(Supp. 1976); Cal. A. B. 1609, reproduced in Hearings on S. 2200 Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 113-31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings].
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
12. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
13. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), en banc hearing denied,
508 F.2d 588 (1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974); cases cited in note 65 infra. Exten-
sion of fourth amendment protection to customers' bank records received scholarly
support as well. See Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439
(1974).
14. 416 U.S. 21, 77-78 (1974).
15. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
16. Id. at 440.
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the district court's overruling of the customer's motion to suppress the sub-
poenas. It reasoned that because the customer had no expectation of privacy
in the records, he lacked standing under the fourth amendment to contest
their production. 17 This rejection in Miller of the constitutional dimension
of the customer's interest is particularly ominous because the retention of
duplicate copies of customer records by banks has increased the storehouse
of information on the customer and has multiplied the opportunity to abuse
his rights if the confidential relationship is not honored.' 8
Even before Miller was decided, however, members of both houses of
Congress had realized that the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank Se-
crecy Act were being enforced in a manner which Congress had never in-
tended. 19 The Secrecy Act had put the bank in the awkward position of act-
ing simultaneously as an agent for the Government and also for its own custo-
mers. In the latter capacity it owed its customers at least an equitable duty of
confidentiality, which was compromised by its duty under the Act to
record its customers' financial affairs. Furthermore, the cost of the record-
keeping to the bank was disproportionate to its usefulness in crime detec-
tion,20 and the bank was forced to pass on this expense to its customers in
higher service charges.
17. Id. at 440-43.
18. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8024 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 527-28, 543-46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
House Financial Privacy Hearings]. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY (1972); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 7; citations at note 2
supra.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970); S. REP. No. 1139, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). See also 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 2, 35-36,
45-47; 1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 68, 487-89; 1974 Senate
Hearings, supra note 10, at 1-2, 23, 177; 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 21-22.
Congress has been particularly vexed by the use of government access to bank records
to inquire into customers' political activities, which are protected under the first amend-
ment, allegedly in the interests of national security but without prior judicial authoriza-
tion. See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 158-59, 166-68; 1975 House
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 108, 122, 140-42, 189-91; 1972 Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 139-43, 164-203.
20. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 17, 23. As one spokesman
from the banking industry has stated, "[W]e are asked to assume that the Congress
intentionally ordered banks to keep records of all 200 million accounts comprising at
least 50 billion separate items in order to obtain information on, at most, less than
one-half of 1 percent of bank accounts." Id. at 17.
The low cost of recordkeeping was cited as a justification of the requirement, H.R.
REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), but in practice it has been quite costly
for banks to honor or contest government access. See 1976 Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 51-52, 113-16; note 35 infra.
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A possible corrective to this current impasse between enforcing the Bank
Secrecy Act and preserving individual rights after Miller may be found in
proposed federal financial privacy legislation. 21  Bills which have been
introduced in both houses of Congress would not only recognize the confiden-
tiality of bank records; they would also provide for notice and standing for
the customer to contest a court order or subpoena served on his bank, and
would permit government access to the records only upon compliance with
certain specified procedures. In each of these respects the proposed legisla-
tion represents a significant departure from the traditional legal approach
to the bank's relationship with its customer, yet it seeks to preserve the con-
fidential nature of the relationship which law and banking custom have
tacitly recognized. This article will first review the legal ramifications of
bank-customer confidentiality both before and after Miller. It then will
show how the attempt to protect the customer's interest, whether constitu-
tionally or statutorily, could create an unprecedented right of privacy for
bank records.
1. DEFINING RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Banks have generally been considered to have a legal duty not to reveal
information about a customer to private parties without the customer's ex-
press or implied consent. 22 Commercial banks have rigidly adhered to this
standard of confidentiality by imposing internal restrictions on information-
gathering and dissemination by employees. 23  In the very rare instances in
21. See, e.g., H.R. 214, H.R. 414, H.R. 550, H.R. 1005, H.R. 2752, H.R 7483,
S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Similar bills had been introduced in earlier
years: S. 2200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3814, S. 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). In the ensuing discussion of proposed federal legislation, only H.R. 214 and
S. 1343 will be referred to, since these bills are under active current consideration and
are typical of the legislation which has been proposed.
22. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 900, 903-07 (1963); Note, supra note 13, at 1463-64.
Implied consent is typically found when the customer lists the bank as a credit reference.
Exceptions to this rule also occur when the bank must disclose data in its own business
interests or when "public duty" demands disclosure. See United States v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234, 1235 (6th Cir. 1973); Tournier v. National Provincial &
Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 473, 481. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d
178, 183 (Iowa 1970) (duty of bank not to divulge customer's affairs runs only to
matters known only to bank and customer)
23. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1974). See also 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 46, 101-03,
105-08; 1975 House Financial Privacy Hearings, supra note 18, at 528, 544-46; 1975
House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 492, 528-29; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra
note 10, at 24; 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 192-200, 228, 263-64, 266;
Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 313, 317-18 (1969-70).
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this country in which a bank has released confidential information to a
nongovernmental third party without the customer's consent, it has been held
liable, although there has been no uniform theory on which liability has been
based.24 Where the party seeking the information is a government official
or agent, however, the bank's duty has been less clear. Bank records are
subject to production in response to valid legal process, 25 and a bank may be
forced to disclose its record of accounts when ordered to do so by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or some other government agency. 26 If the
request is informal, the bank may challenge it and may refuse to relinquish
the records until the requesting party obtains a legal order for their release. 27
If the requesting party fails to obtain a legal order, the customer may, depend-
ing on the circumstances, seek an injunction to prevent the release of his
records28 or move to suppress evidence which was obtained through an
24. Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (im-
plied contract); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1976)
(bank is customer's agent when discharging its obligation as customer's debtor, and agent's
misuse of principal's confidential information constitutes breach of implied contract).
Another line of cases suggests that the customer could maintain an action for invasion
of privacy. See Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds after remand, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386,
146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929); Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Wend. 292 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. .1829). However,
of these cases, only Sewall involved the bank's release of information to a private party.
See generally 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 482 (1970). Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117,
at 809 (4th ed. 1971). Although Prosser cites both Brex and Zimmermann, he also
states that intrusion does not occur unless the object intruded upon is, and is entitled
to be, private. Prosser also states that the inspection of records which must be kept by
law constitutes no invasion of privacy.
25. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United
States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968); O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966);'In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 950 (1965); DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 936 (1963); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912 (1959).
26. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), aff'g 295 F. 142 (S.D.
Ala. 1924); United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Minn. 1973);
United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 112 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ky. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954). See also
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53 (1974); DeMasters v. Arend, 313
F.2d 79 (9th cir. 1963); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 625 (S.D.
Ala. 1946); In re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
27. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, A BANKER'S GUIDE TO IRS PROCEDURES FOR
EXAMINATIONS OF CUSTOMER RECORDS AND LEVIES ON CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS 4 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BANKER'S GUIDE].
28. See Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936); Bowser v. First Nat'l
Bank, 390 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1975); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34
(Ch. 1929). But see Garrett v. United States, 511 F.2d 1037 (9h Cir. 1975) (custo-
mer's standing to intervene is permissive only); Frey v. Dixon, 58 A.2d 86 (Ch. N.J.
1948) (injunctive relief improper where appropriate remedy at law exists).
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unauthorized examination.2 9 Arguably, he may also hold his bank liable for
releasing his records when not legally required to do so.
80
Legal access to bank records may be obtained in several ways. A number
of government agencies are empowered to issue administrative subpoenas
or summonses without prior judicial clearance.3 1  If the subpoena or sum-
mons is contested in court, the agency need not meet a probable cause
standard in order to prevail; relevance or materiality to the inquiry is suffi-
cient.32 A grand jury can subpoena bank records by court order when it
suspects that a law has been violated, and a court can subpoena bank records
as part of the discovery process in a pending case, or to obtain evidence for
trial. 33 Access may also be obtained through the issuance of a search war-
rant, which must meet a probable cause standard under the fourth amend-
ment.3
4
If the governmental request is accompanied by a summons or subpoena
to the bank, both the bank and its customer are placed in a difficult position.
The bank may contest the order in court, but this is an expensive, time-
consuming process, 35 and in contesting the validity of the order, the bank is
not entitled to assert its customer's expectation that his bank records will
29. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 245, 529 P.2d 590, 594-95, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-71 (1974).
30. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290
(1961); BANKER'S GUIDE, supra note 27, at 4.
31. This discussion of legal access must necessarily be generalized, since there are
approximately 100 kinds of administrative summonses and subpoenas alone. Federal
agencies which are authorized to issue administrative summonses and subpoenas include
the Internal Revenue Service, 26 U.S.C. § 7608 (1970); the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77uuu, 78u, 79r, 80a-41, 80b-9 (1970); the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1970); and the National Labor Relations Board, 219
U.S.C. §§ 161, 185, 209 (1970). "Pocket" summonses or subpoenas are most commonly
used by IRS agents to obtain quick access to bank records without prior judicial authori-
zation. The authority of the IRS to subpoena records of an unnamed "John Doe"
customer was sustained in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975).
32. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58. (1964); United States v. DeGrosa,
405 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1973). See also United States v.
Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183,
186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45; FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a), (c); United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
34. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. However, search warrants are rarely used to pro-
vide access to bank records, due to the probable cause requirement and the unsuitability
of a search warrant in a civil proceeding. See, e.g., 1975 House Surveillance Hearings,
supra note 2, at 499, 535, 633-37.
35. The average cost to the bank, according to one estimate, ranges from $225 to
$350 per request. See 1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 499-500,
535-37.
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remain confidential or "private.' 6  As a practical matter, the customer's
ability to contest the order depends on his having notice that his records are
being sought. He usually has such notice, but it is not required by law,
and if he receives none, he loses any opportunity to challenge the order.87
Thus the bank's duty to maintain the confidentiality of its customer's records
has never been unqualified, and the ability of both bank and customer to
defend their confidential relationship against unjustified government intru-
sion can be a complex legal task.
Even when the customer has notice that his bank has been ordered to
permit the inspection of his records, the grounds upon which he can contest
the order are limited. If the order to the bank is in the form of a summons
or subpoena, as is usually the case, the fourth amendment requires only that
the disclosure sought not be unreasonable; otherwise, the subpoena has been
characterized as a figurative or constructive search and seizure, which is
not covered by the fourth amendment because no actual physical search by
the government has occurred.38 Using this reasoning, courts have determined
that an administrative subpoena of records by the IRS, pursuant to its statu-
tory authority, does not violate the fourth amendment,3 9 and that one may
not assert a fourth amendment expectation of privacy to bar production of
records which have been subpoenaed by a grand jury.40 However, courts
have also indicated that constitutional defenses, including those provided by
the fourth amendment, are available against subpoenas duces tecum which
are unreasonable because of overbreadth or irrelevance. 41
36. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974); United States
v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974).
37. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 70 & n.29. See also 1975
House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 477-78, 490-91, 528-29, 664; BANKER'S
GUME, supra note 27, at 6. After the passage of the Secrecy Act, some courts denied
the customer standing altogether, on the ground that he did not own or possess the
records. See cases cited in note 43 infra.
38. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202-08 (1946).
39. United States v. Garrett, 305 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.N.Y. 1969). See United
States v. House, 524 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); United States v. Cedrone, 400 F. Supp.
1203 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
40. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974) (nonparty wit-
ness has no fourth amendment privilege before grand jury), with United States v. Rid-
dick, 519 F.2d 645, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976) (party
defendant lacks standing to contest lawful grand jury and trial subpoenas of bank rec-
ords) and State ex rel. Pollard v. Criminal Court, 329 N.E.2d 573, 584-86 (Ind. 1975)
(grand jury witness may not assert fourth amendment expectation of privacy to bar
production of lawfully subpoenaed records).
41. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906); United States v. Reno, 522
F.2d 572, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 686 n.4
[Vol. 26: 89
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Assuming that a fourth amendment defense to an onerous subpoena is
available, the customer may still be unable to use it. To establish standing
he must show that his rights have been infringed and that he has a possessory
or proprietary interest in the records. 42  Since the copies of his records
which the bank must maintain under the Secrecy Act are owned and possessed
by the bank rather than the customer, a number of courts have denied the
customer standing to contest their production. 43  Because the bank has no
assertable privacy interest in its customer's records and the customer may
lack standing to contest the production of records he neither owns nor pos-
sesses, the customer's expectation that the bank will not release his records
without his notification or consent has been largely unprotected since the
passage of the Secrecy Act. 44
II. FASHIONING AND DENYING A PRIVACY RIGHT
The legal blurring of privacy and confidentiality principles arose from an
effort to give the customer the protection which he has expected but to
which he has never been unequivocally entitled under federal law. This
protection would consist of a requirement that the bank only release his
records in response to a formal government order in the form of a subpoena,
summons or search warrant, and that the customer be afforded notice and
standing to contest the order in court. If the customer's expectation of
confidentiality were encompassed within a constitutional right of privacy,
notice would be required under both the fourth and fourteenth amendments,
and the customer would be constitutionally entitled to standing.45
The rationale for finding such a fourth amendment right had its origins
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 794,
799-801 (D.N.J. 1967), aII'd, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
961 (1969); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126, 1129-32 (D. Del. 1973).
42. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
43. See, e.g., United States v. House, 524 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cedrone, 400 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Ginsburg, 376 F. Supp.
714 (D. Conn. 1974); United States v. Burbank, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9779 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See also In re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
44. See 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 49-55, 99-102; 1975 House Surveil-
lance Hearings, supra note 2, at 51, 496-97, 500-01, 530-37. But see 1976 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 101-05 (voluntary protection of customer's rights by banks which
give customer notice).
45. While this explanation is theoretical, it is similar to the type of argument which
was raised by the defense in both Burrows and Miller. See Note, supra note 13, at 1443-
45, 1456-67; 28 VAND. L. REV. 1361, 1372-73 (1975). See generally Costner & Grim-
mer, Search & Seizure of Bank Records & Reports, 92 BANKING L.J. 347 (1975).
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in Katz v. United States,46 which suggested that property interests would
no longer be the exclusive test of fourth amendment standing and that the
fourth amendment protects people as well as areas from unreasonable search-
es and seizures. Katz also declared, however, that "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public" is not private and therefore is not entitled to
constitutional protection. 47 Thus, a communication whose confidentiality is
dependent upon a person not revealing its content to a third party ordinarily
lacks fourth amendment protection. Because cancelled checks are not consid-
ered to be confidential communications, 4 the customer would not have
standing to contest an order for their production based on his expectation
of privacy in the documents themselves.
However, the information which is contained in bank records-including
where and how a person spends his money-could itself be considered prop-
erty. This information is held by the bank, but the customer expects that
his bank will not use or convey it, other than in the course of its contractual
relationship, without giving the customer notice of its release.49  This expec-
tation has formed the essence of the confidential bank-customer relationship
at common law. The information is not truly "private," since the customer
realizes and, in fact, expects his bank to release it under certain circum-
stances. 0 But in order to retain some control over the manner of its release,
apart from ownership or possession, the customer has asserted, first in
California Bankers5' and later in Miller,52 that he possessed an expectation
of privacy in the information contained in his bank records which would give
him standing under the fourth amendment to contest its production.
In California Bankers, the customer plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of the recordkeeping requirements of the Secrecy Act on numerous
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47. Id. at 351.
48. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1963).
49. See 1975 House Financial Privacy Hearings, supra note 18, at 1872; 1974 Senate
Hearings, supra note 10, at 189-90; Note, supra note 13, at 1451-65; 8 AKRON L. REV.
181, 189 (1974).
The notion that the information contained in bank records is property which belongs
to the customer is supported by both Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847, 848-49
(3d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds after remand, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939),
and Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929). Title to the original
copies of cancelled checks, which is not commercially significant and has not recently
been litigated, belongs to the customer. See Van Dyke v. Ogden Say. Bank, 48 Utah
606, 615416, 161 P. 50, 54 (1916); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-201, 4-208(3).
50. See note 22 supra.
51. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
52. 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), en banc hearing denied, 508 F.2d 588 (5th
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See Brief for Respondent at 8-9, United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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theories, one being that the customers had a fourth amendment interest in
the information contained in bank records which the Secrecy Act's record-
keeping requirements had violated. The Supreme Court denied standing to
the customers under the particular circumstances of the case"3 but empha-
sized that the legislative history of the Act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder provided that access to bank records be controlled by "existing
legal process."'5 4 A majority of the Justices also expressed concern that
the recordkeeping requirements might at some point infringe upon individual
privacy rights. 5-5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Miller,56 relied on
the "existing legal process" language in the Secrecy Act and in California
Bankers to sustain defendant Miller's motion to suppress evidence in his
trial on criminal conspiracy and tax fraud charges. The prosecution had
obtained Miller's bank records through the issuance of allegedly defective
administrative subpoenas duces tecum 5 7 during the grand jury investi-
gation into these charges. The records, which were released by two of his
banks without notification to Miller, helped to establish at least three of the
overt acts crucial to his subsequent conviction."8 Reversing the district
court's ruling on Miller's motion, the court of appeals held that obtaining
evidence through a faulty subpoena constituted an "unlawful invasion of
Miller's privacy" 59 and that he was entitled to a new trial, untainted by the
improperly acquired evidence.6 0
In Burrows v. Superior Court,6 1 a customer was given standing under a
provision of the California constitution, 62 identical in wording to the fourth
amendment of the Federal Constitution, to suppress evidence which had been
obtained from his bank records after his bank had voluntarily acceded to
53. 416 U.S. 21, 53-55 (1974). The plaintiffs argued that under the broad wording
of the regulations, the Secretary of the Treasury could order the immediate reporting of
any records made or kept under the Act. But the Court held that since the Secretary
did not in fact require such reporting, the customers' claim was without merit, that is,
they had suffered no injury in fact which would give them standing under U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, § 2.
54. 416 U.S. at 27, 52, 54 & n.24, 68-69 & n.28.
55. Id. at 78-79 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring), 82, 85-86 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting), 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 95-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 757-58 & nn.5 & 6. The subpoenas were issued by the U.S. Attorney
rather than a court and were returnable on a date when the grand jury was not in ses-
sion. No return was made to a court.
58. Id. at 753, 756.
59. Id. at 756.
60. ld. at 758.
61. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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an informal government request to inspect them. The court stated that it
would be unrealistic to insist that the customer be bound by the bank's
consent to the inspection, and it further declared that judicial interpretations
of the extent of constitutional protection for individual privacy should be
expanded to counter the ability of government, using sophisticated machines,
to "intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from
prying eyes and inquisitive minds." '6 3
Following Burrows and the appellate court's decision in Miller, several
courts recognized customers' expectations of privacy to give them standing
to contest orders for production of their bank records. Among these deci-
sions, the most notable victory for the customer was in Valley Bank v. Super-
ior Court, in which the California Supreme Court held that notice to the
customer was required by the California constitution.6 4 It should be noted,
however, that the cases which acknowledged the customer's expectation of
privacy did not result in the barring of all government access to bank records.
Instead, their effect was to protect the confidentiality of these records by
granting notice and standing to the customer in the absence of statute. 5
When Miller was appealed, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the customer had an expectation of privacy in his bank records. 66 Although
Miller's bank records had been obtained in connection with a grand jury
investigation, the Court did not base its decision on the general inapplicabil-
ity of fourth amendment considerations to grand jury subpoenas. Instead,
the six-to-two majority emphasized that the records were not confidential
communications between Miller and his banks, but rather that they were
negotiable instruments containing information which Miller had voluntarily
communicated. Thus Miller lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their contents and assumed the risk that his banks would convey the informa-
tion to the Government.6 7 The banks' failure to notify Miller was character-
ized as a "neglect without legal consequences." 6 8 Burrows was distinguished
on the basis that the bank in that case had provided records to the police
63. 13 Cal. 3d at 248, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
64. 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 542 P.2d 977, 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1975).
65. See Bowser v. First Nat'l Bank, 390 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1975); Bergman v.
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 389 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Shapiro v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 84 Misc. 2d 938, 376 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
66. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43.
67. Id. The Court made no distinction between the copies of checks, which are
"negotiable" in the original, and the copies of deposit slips and at least one loan applica-
tion which the Government obtained in Miller, which are not negotiable.
68. Id. at 443 n.5.
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upon an informal oral request and thus had not conformed to existing legal
process.6 9
The Miller opinion rejected the idea that the bank had any legal obligation
to notify its customers of a governmental request for records, and it indi-
cated that customers would lack standing to contest a formal order even if
they did receive notice. The Court's treatment of Burrows indicated that
customers might retain standing to contest an informal request, but since the
lack of a right of privacy was expressed in terms of the nonconfidential
nature of the records themselves, the customers' right to hold the bank liable
for any breach of the confidential relationship was jeopardized.70 And
although Miller involved only a fourth amendment claim, the Court's re-
jection of financial privacy as a constitutional right and of notice as a legal
requirement indicated that customers who claimed standing on first or fifth
amendment grounds would fare no better.71
III. PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY THROUGH FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Between the passage of the Secrecy Act and the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller, customers became more concerned about the lack of protection for
their bank records.7 2  The Secrecy Act facilitated government access to
bank records without specifying the legal process for obtaining them, and the
number of government requests for records increased dramatically following
69. Id. at 445 & n.7. But see id. at 447-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting, would have
followed Burrows).
70. See notes 22-24 & accompanying text supra. Given the Court's reliance on the
fact that bank records are not "confidential," one could argue after Miller that banks
owe their customers no duty of confidentiality which could be breached, regardless of
whether the access to the records was obtained through "existing legal process" or other-
wise.
71. Standing to contest a subpoena of bank records on first amendment grounds would
presumably depend on the discretion of the court and would be permissive only. See
425 U.S. at 444-45 n.6. See also 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 108, 168.
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court held that a taxpayer
could not exercise his fifth amendment privilege to bar the production of documents pos-
sessed by his accountant and relating to the preparation of his tax return. Fisher indi-
cated that the fifth amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination would
not apply where the taxpayer himself was not required to give self-incriminating testi-
mony to authenticate the documents, id. at 396-401. Applying this reasoning to Miller's
facts, it seems clear that Miller could not have successfully claimed a fifth amendment
privilege, not only because the records were not in his possession, but because the sub-
poenas were directed to his banks, and they, not he, authenticated the records which were
released. Cf. Gannet v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 U.S.L.W. 2342 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 1976)
(bank records kept in accordance with Bank Secrecy Act are not protected by attorney-
client privilege). But see note 106 infra.
72. Compare polling results discussed in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra
note 6, at 466-70, with those discussed in 1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note
2, at 65-66.
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its passage. Because of the cost to banks and the absence of a statutory duty
to notify their customers, banks rarely contested either formal or informal
government requests. 73  The proposed financial privacy legislation74 came
about as a congressional antidote to abuses of customers' expectations of
confidentiality, and it has received broad bipartisan support75 which has
gained new momentum since Miller was handed down. Thus one possible
result of Miller may be to encourage the passage of curative legislation
which has been four years in the making.76
Both financial privacy bills would alter the customer's rights by specifying
what procedures must be followed by the government to gain access to his
records and by giving him standing to contest their production. Four basic
methods of access are proposed: customer consent, administrative summons
or subpoena coupled with consent or court order, judicial subpoena, and
search warrant. 77  The customer could authorize disclosure of his records
for a period of one year or less by giving his bank a signed, dated statement
identifying the records which could be examined and specifying who could
see them and for what purpose. He could revoke his consent at any time,
and it could not be required as a condition of doing business with a bank.78
If access were sought by administrative subpoena or summons, the govern-
ment would have to give the customer advance notice in person or by certi-
fied mail; the customer would then have 10 days under the Senate bill and
18 days under the House bill to move to quash. 79 An administrative sum-
mons or subpoena would also have to specify the name of the customer and,
if applicable, the statutory purpose for which the information is sought.80
73. See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 101, 116; 1975 House Surveil-
lance Hearings, supra note 2, at 189, 193, 490-95, 529-33, 642; BANKER'S GUIDE, supra
note 27, at 4-7. In effect, the bank's decision to contest was based on the likelihood of
economic injury to the bank, not to the customer.
74. H.R. 214, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [Committee Print] [hereinafter cited as
H.R. 214]; S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1343]. See
note 21 supra.
75. The proposed legislation has been approved by the American Bar Association,
the American Bankers Association, the California Bankers Association, and the American
Civil Liberties Union. See 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 37, 39, 46, 160;
1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 65-66; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra
note 10, at 175-76.
76. In its Supreme Court brief, the Government argued that the customer's rights
should be legislatively rather than judicially determined. Brief for Petitioner at 31 &
n.21, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
77. H.R. 214 § 2(a); S. 1343 § 4(a).
78. H.R. 214 § 4; S. 1343 § 6.
79. H.R. 214 §§ 2(a)(2), 5; S. 1343 §§ 4(a)(2), 7(a)(1), 9(b).
80. H.R. 214 § 5; S. 1343 § 7(a)(2). These provisions are designed to restrict the
use of the "John Doe" summons.
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A bank could no longer release customer records pursuant to an administra-
tive summons or subpoena without either the customer's authorization or a
court order,81 and free interagency exchange of information on a particular
customer without his notification and approval would be prohibited,82 absent
statutory authorization.
The two bills treat judicial subpoenas and standing somewhat differently.
Both adhere to the traditional standards of good cause and relevance as pre-
conditions for the issuance of judicial subpoenas.8 3  But the Senate bill
requires that the customer always be given prior notice of a judicial sub-
poena,84 whereas the House bill provides a procedure for delaying notice to
the customer if the court determines that advance notification would seriously
jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation.8 5 Both bills grant customers
standing to contest government access to their bank records, a right which
Miller denied them. The Senate bill would give the customer the same rights
which he would have if the records were in his possession, 86 thereby arguably
allowing him to exercise a fifth amendment privilege to bar their production
if the records were sought through subpoena. 87  By contrast, the House bill
would limit the customer's right to "standing to move to quash or to seek
other relief."88 Both bills include a provision for injunctive relief;89 the
House bill also provides for recovery of both actual and punitive damages.90
The major difference between the two bills, other than their different
approaches to judicial subpoenas and customer standing, lies in their scope
of coverage. Both bills cover records held by "financial institutions," a term
which includes savings and loan associations and credit unions as well as
banks,91 but the House bill covers telephone and postal records as well,
81. H.R. 214 §H 3(a), 5(3), 7(a)(3), (4); S. 1343 §§ 4, 7(b), 9(b).
82. H.R. 214 § 9; S. 1343 § 10. Thus, for example, information obtained by the
IRS for use in a civil tax proceeding could not be transferred to another government
agency such as the FBI.
83. H.R. 214 § 7(a)(1); S. 1343 § 9(a)(1).
84. S. 1343 §§ 9(a)(2), 9(b).
85. H.R. 214 §§ 7(a)(2), 3(b), (c), (d). For example, delay of notification of
issuance may be obtained if the subpoena is issued in connection with bribery of public
officials or witnesses, obstruction of state or local law enforcement, kidnapping, espion-
age, or sabotage. For a more complete list of crimes covered, see id. § 7(c).
86. S. 1343 § 4(b).
87. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See also note 71 supra and
note 106 infra.
88. H.R. 214 § 2(b).
89. Id. § 12(b); S. 1343 § 16.
90. H.R. 214 § 12(a).
91. H.R. 214 § l(a); S. 1343 § 3(a). The bills would cover bank credit cards
such as Master Charge, but not nonbank cards such as American Express. See H.R.
214 § l(a)(4); S. 1343 § 3(a)(4).
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whereas the Senate bill is concerned only with financial privacy. The Senate
bill refers to the confidential nature of bank records and the bank-customer
relationship, 92 while the House bill does not refer to confidentiality at all
and mentions "privacy" only in its title. The latter is essentially a federal
bill, while the former would apply to records sought at the local and state
level, as well as the federal. 93 The Senate bill, unlike the House bill, would
expressly amend the Secrecy Act by forbidding the Secretary of the Treasury
from requiring the maintenance or transmittal of customer records except as
required by a supervisory agency or by the Internal Revenue Code.94
There is ample reason for passage of a right to financial privacy act at
this time. Miller has settled the question of whether the customer's rights
will be judicially protected in the absence of a statute. The Supreme Court,
in sustaining the Secrecy Act as "within the legislative authority of Congress,"
has nevertheless acknowledged the power of Congress to change its mind.95
The State of Maryland has recently enacted legislation similar to the proposed
Senate bill.9 6 Precedent for passage of a federal financial privacy act can be
found in existing federal legislation,97 and legislation which has recently been
introduced in the Senate would extend financial privacy safeguards to holders
of all credit card accounts.98 Probably the most persuasive indicator of
congressional willingness to give the customer notice and standing is included
in a section of the Tax Reform Act, which was passed by the House of
Representatives on December 4, 1975 and by the Senate on August 6,
1976.99 This section would grant a taxpayer notice and standing to con-
test any third-party IRS administrative summons and would significantly
limit the power of the IRS to issue a "John Doe" summons by requiring that
92. S. 1343 § 2. Section 2(a)(2) states that "the confidential relationships between
financial institutions and their customers [are] built on trust and must be preserved and
protected .... "
93. Compare H.R. 214 § 2(a), with S. 1343 § 4(a).
94. S. 1343 § 12.
95. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 77 & n.30 (1974). At recent
hearings on S. 1343, Miller was interpreted as the Court's way of throwing the gauntlet
to Congress to amend the Secrecy Act. See 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,
39, 157-60.
96. See note 10 supra.
97. A telephone company and its employees are prohibited from divulging the exist-
ence or contents of telephone communications except upon lawful authority under 47
U.S.C. § 605 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). Credit reporting agencies are subject to
statutory limitations and penalties upon the release of certain types of consumer informa-
tion under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970).
98. S. 3559, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
99. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REc. 11,858-59 (daily ed.
Dec. 4, 1975). Cf. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 CONG. REc. 13,
797 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976).
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a prior court proceeding establish reasonable cause for its issuance. 100
Since the IRS is the government agency which most frequently seeks access
to bank records, and since both Congress and the courts have given the IRS
broad authority to examine customer records to determine tax liability, 10'
it would be anomalous to deny the customer similar rights as against investi-
gatory agencies which have been denied the power to issue an administrative
summons and which have been required to justify their access by applying for
a court order. 10 2
IV. VESTIGES OF PRIVACY
Until the proposed legislation has been enacted and interpreted, it will
be difficult to discern its full impact on the customer. Analysis is further
complicated by the Miller decision, since its full meaning is still not altogether
clear. However, financial privacy legislation has encountered formidable
opposition from law enforcement officials' 0 3 which could hinder its passage.
This opposition also indicates that in attempting to remedy the excessive
enforcement of the domestic recordkeeping requirements of the Secrecy Act,
Congress may be contemplating legislation which tips the balance too far
toward the customer's expectation of confidentiality as against the public's
need for certain kinds of financial information concerning customers.
An interesting question which has been raised but not clearly answered
by the hearings on the proposed legislation is the extent to which it would
permit the customer to assert a right of privacy in his bank records. The
100. Compare H.R. 10 612 § 1211, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), with H.R. 10612
§ 1205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Senate version of the House bill includes
a similar provision on third-party summonses, but it gives more particularized attention
to the notice requirement and provides for reimbursement of fees and costs for third-
party compliance. Section 1205 of the Senate version was signed into law on October
4, 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1699 (U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 15, 1976)).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7601, 7602.
102. A distinction has been made between authority to inspect bank records under
the Internal Revenue Code to determine tax liability and under the Bank Secrecy Act
to determine expenditures rather than income. As one spokesman for Bank Secrecy
Act reform has stated: "No legitimate revenue-collecting purpose can be served . . .
when the Government asks for reports which may . . . cover the minutia and detail of
any individual's disbursements: from what one spends at the local liquor store or at the
club to what contributions or membership fees one chooses to give to political or social
organizations. It is all revealed in the checks one writes." 1972 Senate Hearings, supra
note 2, at 265. See also 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 38-43; 1975 House Sur-
veillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 202-05, 487-90, 529, 634-47, 663-68.
103. See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 117-50; 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 10, at 132-38, 143-52, 198-208.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
House bill seems to have eliminated any prospect of the customer's asserting
such a right by restricting his rights to notice and standing to intervene,
with even the notice provision being a qualified one.10 4  The Senate bill,
however, would give the customer the same rights which he would have if
the records were in his possession, and those rights are formidable. Possessory
rights, for example, would permit him to challenge a government request for
the records on the fourth amendment ground of unreasonableness. While
this fourth amendment interest would not bar government access altogether,
it could encourage litigation on the question of reasonable access in the
absence of a search warrant and thereby defeat a basic purpose of the legis-
lation, which is to resolve the meaning of existing legal process. 105
It could also be argued that the Senate bill, by treating bank records "as if"
they were in the customer's possession, would grant the customer proprietary
rights in the records which would make them truly inaccessible to the gov-
ernment in an ongoing criminal investigation. 10  This interpretation of the
proposed Senate bill would have a practical effect similar to the constitutional
right of privacy argument which the Court recently rejected in Miller, in that
104. See note 85 supra.
105. Compare, e.g., H.R. 214 § 7, with S. 1343 § 9. Although the Senate bill states
that judicial subpoenas will only be issued for "good cause," this term is not further
defined. If the proposed legislation gave the customer the equivalent of possessory
rights in the records, he would have standing under the fourth amendment to challenge
any request other than by search warrant on the ground that good cause was lacking,
and the criteria for access would still require case-by-case definition.
106. An extremely troublesome consequence of granting the customer possessory
rights lies in the fifth amendment area. The Supreme Court has indicated that no
fifth amendment privilege is violated by the production of documents used and held by
an accountant for the preparation of a taxpayer's return. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976). In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the
Court held that the seizure of an attorney's business records pursuant to lawful search
warrant did not violate his fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, since he had not been compelled either to commit the records to writing or to
authenticate them at trial. Id. at 473. In Andresen, however, the Court indicated in
dictum that it might not have reached the same result if the records had been sought by
subpoena, since the "very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication
of incriminating information. Id. Applying this reasoning to the bank records context
in light of the wording of the Senate bill, it would seem possible for a customer to exer-
cise a fifth amendment privilege in response to a subpoena, if not a search warrant, and
thus bar production. The creation of such a right would shield bank records from gov-
ernment access and would make them truly "private" rather than "confidential," in that
customers would be able to bar government access to the information, unless the govern-
ment could meet the probable cause requirement to secure a search warrant. Such a
result would run counter to the fundamental philosophy of the fifth amendment, which
"adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him." Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 471-73 (1976); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
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it would ignore the government's need for the information instead of attempt-
ing to regulate government access while preserving the customer's standing
to contest a governmental order.
Moreover, it is presently unclear whether either financial privacy bill would
apply to grand jury subpoenas. As has previously been noted, no general
right of privacy exists in a grand jury proceeding,10 7 and grand jury subpoenas
are not subject to mandatory prior judicial review. l08 However, if the pro-
posed legislation were construed to apply to grand jury subpoenas, the grand
jury would have to persuade a neutral magistrate that it had good cause to
examine the bank records before a subpoena could be issued. The type of
subpoena that was upheld in Miller would not be permissible because it was
authorized by the prosecutor's office rather than a neutral magistrate. 10 9
Since under the Senate bill the requirement of prior notice to the customer
could not be waived for any legitimate law enforcement purpose,110 some
needed information relating to ongoing criminal activity would undoubtedly
be lost."' The customer would have more protection before the grand jury
than he has been able to claim in the past, and the grand jury's traditionally
broad investigatory powers would be correspondingly limited. This expan-
sion of the customer's rights at the pretrial stage would be a mixed blessing,
for the grand jury's broad authority has long been considered fundamental
to the functioning of the American system of justice.". 2
107. See notes 33, 38 & 40 supra.
108. In Annenberg v. Roberts, 2 A.2d 612, 619 (Pa. 1938), the court drew a dis-
tinction between the effect of an unlawful nonjudicial subpoena duces tecum and a
judicial subpoena duces tecum, holding that the former was subject to more stringent
constitutional requirements than the latter because a defendant who is summoned before
a nonjudicial body lacks the right to have legal counsel present to preserve his constitu-
tional rights. This argument was raised but rejected in Miller. See Brief for Respondent
at 8-9, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). But see United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1976); Brief for Petitioner at 36-43, United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976). See also 1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 502,
539; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 187.
109. Compare Brief for Petitioner at 36-43, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), with S. 1343 § 9.
110. See S. 1343 §§ 4(a)(3), 5(b), 8.
111. This loss of information could occur in a number of ways, but the two examples
which have received the most attention are: (1) where the customer uses the notice to
conceal or destroy information, or to flee the jurisdiction, see, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 10, at 137-38; and (2) where the customer, having notice, claims a fifth
amendment privilege against authenticating the information, see note 106 supra. It
should be noted, however, that corporations do not have, and therefore could not assert,
the constitutional privilege, although they are covered as "customers" by S. 1343.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88 (1972). See also 1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 3,
at 119-31, 138, 141-43, 45; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 137; 1972 Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 171-75.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
It should be remembered that the theory that the customer had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his bank records was not developed or accepted as a reason
to bar all government access to bank records. Instead, it was a means of
granting the customer notice and standing to contest an order for their pro-
duction in the absence of a statute, since the customer could assert no posses-
sory or proprietary interest in the copies which the Secrecy Act required the
bank to keep. 113 The courts which recognized the customer's expectation of
privacy between the passage of the Secrecy Act and the Supreme Court's
Miller decision did so in order to give the customer a remedy where he other-
wise would have had none. The expectation of privacy rationale was used to
balance the interest of the customer against that of the government by giving
the customer the right to receive notice,114 the right to intervene and to ob-
tain injunctive relief," 5 or standing to move to quash or modify an overly
broad subpoena"16 or to move to suppress improperly obtained evidence.'
1 7
To the extent that the proposed legislation, particularly the Senate bill,
could render the records inaccessible rather than accessible under prescribed
conditions, it would upset the balance between individual and public interests
which both Congress and the courts have attempted to achieve.
One possible response to this criticism of the wording of the Senate bill
would be to assert that Miller disposed of the customer's privacy interest in
the records entirely. The constitutional basis for the enactment of the Senate
bill, however, is at least partly found in the commerce clause, 118 and Congress
possesses the authority to afford the customer more protection than is consti-
tutionally required. 1 9 While the interpretation of the legislation will ulti-
113. See notes 45-65 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 542 P.2d 977, 980,
125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1975).
115. See Bowser v. First Nat'l Bank, 390 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (D. Md. 1975).
116. See Bergman v. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 389 F. Supp. 1127, 1130
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Shapiro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 84 Misc. 2d 938, 942-44, 376
N.Y.S.2d 365, 370-71 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
117. See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S.
435 (1976); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247-48, 529 P.2d 590, 596,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974). While Miller did not overrule Burrows, it seems clear
that federal officials consider the right of privacy which was asserted in Burrows to be
a state rule of privilege which does not apply where a federal question has been raised.
See Gannet v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 U.S.L.W. 2342, 2343 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 1976);
1975 House Surveillance Hearings, supra note 2, at 495, 530.
118. S. 1343 §§ 2(a)(3), 2(b).
119. See U.S. CoNST. art. I § 8[18] and amend. XIV, § 5. See also Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-52 & n.10 (1966) (power of Congress to enforce four-
teenth amendment through remedial legislation); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (power of Congress to enforce commerce clause through ap-
propriate legislation); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 193-97.
However, unless specific findings are incorporated into the legislative history of a
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mately rest with the courts, Congress could eliminate confusion before a
financial privacy act is passed. By clearly defining the customer's rights
in terms of notice and standing, Congress could eliminate past misconceptions
as to whether bank records are "secret" and whether the bank's relationship
with its customer is a privileged one. Likewise, by addressing the customer's
rights in terms of "confidentiality" rather than "privacy," Congress could
eliminate the unintended confusion in terminology which decisions such as
Miller have perpetuated.
V. CONCLUSION
The impetus to protect the customer's expectation that the information in
his bank records will remain confidential has paralleled the growth of man-
datory bank recordkeeping. When Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act,
it declared that the Act involved no constitutional issues and posed no threat
to individual liberties. Its conclusions were based on the "creditable" record
of the banking industry in protecting its relationship with its customers.1 20
In practice, however, the Secrecy Act has compromised the confidential
bank-customer relationship. The Act has compelled banks to act as the
government's recordkeepers, and the courts, in upholding the constitutionality
of the Act, have deprived the customer of any protected interest in docu-
ments of his own making. After the combined efforts of banks and cus-
tomers to attack the constitutionality of the Act failed in California Bankers,
and the customer's expectation of privacy was rejected in Miller, the best
remaining opportunity to protect the customer's expectations would seem to
be through federal financial privacy legislation.
The proposed legislation, however, has not fully defined the dimensions
of the rights which it would provide the customer. Given the different con-
struction of standing in the two bills, it is presently unclear whether the
passage of financial privacy legislation would give the customer only notice
and standing to contest government access to bank records, or whether it
would also give him possessory rights which could enable him to block their
use by the government altogether. It is also unclear whether any privacy
interest which the customer might acquire through the legislation could be
financial privacy act to support the assertion that the recordkeeping requirements of the
Secrecy Act burden interstate commerce, its constitutionality is at least debatable. See,
e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 1976
Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 144-45 (congressional power to legislate under the
commerce clause should be tempered with restraint where principles of federalism are
involved).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970).
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asserted at the investigatory or pretrial discovery stage. Since the custom-
er's expectation of privacy was a theory which was developed in order to
give him standing to contest government access to copies of his bank records
despite his lack of ownership or possession, it would appear that the proposed
legislation is directed toward the balancing of existing rights rather than the
creation of new ones. The legislative history of any financial privacy act
which Congress passes should reflect this balance.
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